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INTRODUCTION
Sarah had been working with Andrew as her immediate supervi-
sor for one year. Sarah was known around the office for making
sexually explicit jokes with her coworkers, both male and female.
She never made such jokes with Andrew or any other supervisor.
One day, Andrew began directing sexually explicit jokes at Sarah,
and he continued this conduct for several months. Although Sarah
never laughed or verbally responded to Andrew’s jokes, she
sometimes smiled in response. Sarah never filed a complaint with
human resources or spoke to anyone about her supervisor’s new
behavior. If she were to later file a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and then sue her
employer because of Andrew’s conduct under a hostile environment
theory, most courts would require Sarah to prove that Andrew’s
conduct was “unwelcome.”
In fiscal year 2012, 7,571 charges of sexual harassment were filed
with the EEOC, and the EEOC found reasonable cause in 676
cases.1 Despite the prevalence of sexual harassment claims, the
federal courts of appeals still have vague and diverging standards
on how Sarah would prove that Andrew’s conduct was unwelcome.
The unwelcome requirement has been subject to much criticism
since the Supreme Court held in 1986 that a hostile environment
claim is cognizable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII).2
Courts can analyze whether conduct is unwelcome from multiple
perspectives: (1) the subjective plaintiff—whether this particular
plaintiff perceived the accused’s3 conduct as unwelcome; (2) the
1. Sexual Harassment Charges, FY 2010-FY 2013, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, [hereinafter, Sexual Harassment Charges], http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
2. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
3. Although the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the courts of appeals are in
almost complete agreement that under Title VII a supervisor or coworker may not be sued for
sexual harassment in his individual capacity; the plaintiff has a claim under Title VII against
only the employer. See Scott J. Connolly, Note, Individual Liability of Supervisors for Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII: Courts’ Reliance on the Rules of Statutory Construction, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 421, 424-25 (2001). Because individuals who sexually harass in the workplace may not
be personally liable under Title VII, this Note refers to the person accused of sexual
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reasonable plaintiff—whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff ’s
position would perceive the accused’s conduct as unwelcome; (3) the
subjective accused—whether this particular accused person knew
that the plaintiff did not welcome4 his5 conduct; or (4) the reasonable
accused—whether a reasonable person in the accused’s position
would have known that the plaintiff did not welcome his conduct.
The Supreme Court has not been clear on which perspective
courts should apply in the unwelcomeness inquiry, and the federal
courts of appeals have consequently developed unclear and conflict-
ing standards. This Note analyzes the unwelcome requirement from
each of the above perspectives and concludes that the reasonable
accused person perspective is most productive in eliminating sex-
based discrimination from the workplace.
This Note then outlines research in social science on supervisor-
subordinate relations and concludes from such research that it is
unreasonable for a supervisor to believe that his subordinate
welcomes severe or pervasive conduct that can reasonably be
perceived as creating a hostile or abusive work environment.
Accordingly, this Note advocates for the following framework when
the alleged harasser was the plaintiff’s supervisor at the time of the
harassment: The court should presume that the accused’s conduct
was unwelcome and not require the plaintiff to prove unwel-
comeness as part of her prima facie case. The defendant-employer
may then have an affirmative defense that the plaintiff welcomed
the accused’s conduct by unambiguously soliciting or inviting the
behavior through verbal communication between the plaintiff and
the accused. Courts should analyze such evidence from the perspec-
tive of the reasonable accused.
harassment as the “accused” instead of as the “defendant.”
4. Conduct certainly exists that is neither unwelcome nor welcome; one can be confronted
with conduct of another that one is ambivalent about. Nevertheless, for clarity’s sake, this
Note assumes that when conduct is not unwelcome, it is welcome.
5. For simplicity, this Note assumes that the plaintiff is female and the accused is male.
Though the number of sexual harassment claims by males is slowly increasing, the vast
majority of plaintiffs are still female. Sexual Harassment Charges, supra note 1 (noting that
only 17.8 percent of the charges submitted to the EEOC in 2012 were filed by males). This
characterization, however, does not affect the analysis. The framework developed in this Note
applies regardless of the sex of the plaintiff or accused. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII).
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This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the two
theories under which an employee may bring a sexual harassment
claim under Title VII, the elements of the hostile environment cause
of action, and the purpose of the unwelcome requirement within the
sexual harassment context. Part II recounts the inconsistent and
sometimes vague tests that the courts of appeals have developed for
determining whether the unwelcome requirement is satisfied. This
Part also describes five criticisms of the requirement that this
Note’s proposed framework subsequently addresses.
Part III analyzes four different perspectives from which courts
can view the unwelcome requirement and ultimately chooses the
reasonable accused perspective as the most productive in serving
the purposes of the unwelcome requirement and Title VII generally.
This Part focuses on the substance of the requirement—how courts
should analyze unwelcomeness in hostile environment cases. Part
III also determines which party must bear the burden—the plaintiff
or the defendant-employer—of proving welcomeness or unwel-
comeness when the accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor at the
time of the alleged harassment. Applying research in supervisor-
subordinate relations to the reasonable accused perspective of the
unwelcome requirement informs this analysis and leads to an
empirically grounded framework for courts to apply in supervisor-
subordinate hostile environment cases.
This Note adds two new elements to current scholarship on the
unwelcome requirement. First, this Note analyzes the four possible
perspectives of the unwelcomeness inquiry in order to arrive at a
perspective that is not redundant of any other element of the hostile
environment claim and best serves the purposes of the requirement
and Title VII generally. No work thus far has analyzed the require-
ment in such a manner. Second, this Note applies studies looking
particularly at the relationship between supervisors and subordi-
nates, not simply males and females, to the unwelcomeness
perspective found to be the most productive. Only after analyzing all
of the possible perspectives and applying data about supervisor-
subordinate relations does this Note advocate for shifting the
burden to the defendant-employer to prove welcomeness. Other
commentators have recommended shifting the burden to the
defendant, but this Note advocates for such a shift only in the
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supervisor-subordinate context. The burden-shifting advocated for
here is limited to contexts in which it is unreasonable—based on
how people interact in the workplace—for the accused to believe
that the plaintiff welcomed his conduct. No work thus far has
advocated for a shift in the burden of proof for this element in only
a particular class of cases.
It is important to return to this topic today, twenty-eight years
after the Supreme Court held that hostile environment claims are
cognizable under Title VIII, because the courts of appeals still have
inconsistent standards for what a hostile environment plaintiff must
prove, new data has emerged on supervisor-subordinate relations,
and in two 2013 opinions the Supreme Court made it more difficult
for employment discrimination plaintiffs to proceed to trial and
recover damages. The Supreme Court recently held in Vance v. Ball
State University that for purposes of an employer’s vicarious
liability under Title VII, a “supervisor” is someone “empowered by
the employer to take tangible employment actions against the
victim,” not simply one who has the power to “direct another’s
work.”6 The Court also held in University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar that when the plaintiff alleges that her
employer retaliated against her for complaining of discrimination,
she must prove that the retaliation was the “but-for” cause of the
adverse employment action taken against her, and not simply a
motivating factor.7 Because these recent decisions make it more
difficult for employment discrimination plaintiffs to recover, now
seems like an appropriate time to analyze what has been perceived
as yet another roadblock most courts of appeals have placed on a
plaintiff ’s path to recovery for conduct creating a hostile work
environment: the unwelcome requirement.
6. 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439, 2444 (2013). For the purposes of this Note, the term
“supervisor”—when used to describe the recommended framework—refers to the broader
notion of a supervisor, which includes one who has the ability to direct another’s daily
activities.
7. 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
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I. HISTORY OF THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT CAUSE OF ACTION AND
THE PURPOSE OF THE UNWELCOME REQUIREMENT
A. The Hostile Environment Cause of Action Under Title VII
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating in certain
contexts on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.8
Congress did not explicitly mention sexual harassment in Title VII.
The EEOC, however, created guidelines for sexual harassment in
1980 stating that harassment based on sex is a violation of Title
VII.9 The EEOC guidelines are not binding on courts, but the
Supreme Court finds them to “constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.”10 In 1986, the Supreme Court held in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson that a “hostile environment” claim is
cognizable under Title VII.11
Plaintiffs can bring a claim of sexual harassment under two
theories: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.12 Under a quid
pro quo theory, the plaintiff must show that the accused “explicitly
or implicitly condition[ed] a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job
detriment, upon an employee’s acceptance of sexual conduct.”13
Under a hostile environment theory, the plaintiff need not show
economic harm resulting from the discrimination;14 the plaintiff
must show only that the accused’s conduct was severe or pervasive
enough “to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and
create an abusive working environment.”15 To do so, the plaintiff
must establish the following elements: (1) she belongs to a protected
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
10. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
11. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
12. See id. at 65 (describing hostile environment sexual harassment as “non quid pro quo”
harassment). These two theories can also be found in the EEOC’s 1980 guidelines on sexual
harassment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
13. Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Nichols
v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994)).
14. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
15. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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class;16 (2) the accused’s conduct was based on sex; (3) the conduct
was unwelcome; (4) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
such that it altered the conditions of employment; (5) the conduct
created a hostile or abusive work environment both objectively and
subjectively; and (6) a basis exists for imputing liability to the
employer.17 The fifth element requires the plaintiff to show that a
reasonable person would perceive the accused’s conduct as creating
a hostile or abusive work environment and the plaintiff subjectively
perceived her work environment as hostile or abusive.18
Finally, the Supreme Court in Meritor stated that whether the
alleged conduct was “unwelcome” constitutes “[t]he gravamen of any
sexual harassment claim.”19 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied partly on the EEOC’s 1980 guidelines, which state that only
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment” under certain conditions.20 The Court explained that
“unwelcome” does not mean “voluntary;” rather, the unwelcomeness
determination turns on whether the plaintiff “by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.”21
In further explaining how courts should determine whether
conduct is unwelcome, the Court stated that a plaintiff ’s “sexually
provocative speech or dress” or “personal fantasies” are “obviously
relevant” to the analysis.22 Again, the Court relied on the EEOC
guidelines, which state that the unwelcomeness analysis should
16. Technically, Title VII does not protect only certain classes of people. Members of both
majority and minority groups can state a claim for discrimination under Title VII based on
its protected categories: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Despite this technicality,
courts continue to list this element among those required to state a Title VII claim.
EMPLOYMENT LAW 54-55 (Mark A. Rothstein & Lance Liebman eds., 7th ed. 2011).
17. See, e.g., O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001). The hostile
environment elements are sometimes phrased differently depending on the circuit. See, e.g.,
Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In order to establish
a hostile working environment claim, a plaintiff must prove five elements: (1) the employee
belonged to a protected class; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a ‘term, condition, or
privilege’ of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take prompt remedial action.”).
18. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
21. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
22. Id. at 68-69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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depend on the totality of the circumstances, including “the nature
of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged
incidents occurred;”23 hence, the Court held that there is no per se
rule against the admissibility of such evidence.24 Any determination
that the probative value of such evidence will be outweighed by the
potential for unfair prejudice to the plaintiff should be made by the
trial court.25 Following this language, the vast majority of the courts
of appeals require the plaintiff to prove, as part of her prima facie
case, that the accused’s conduct was unwelcome before she can state
a claim under Title VII for sexual harassment under a hostile
environment theory.26
B. Purpose of the Unwelcome Requirement
It makes at least intuitive sense why the Supreme Court would
characterize unwelcomeness as the “gravamen” of any sexual
harassment claim.27 After all, courts are not in the business of
awarding damages to plaintiffs who were confronted with conduct
that they, in fact, welcomed. But there must be a reason for
requiring plaintiffs to prove as part of their prima facie hostile
environment claim that the accused’s conduct was unwelcome,
because such a requirement is not imposed on plaintiffs in all
suits.28 Once the purpose of the requirement is clear, this Note
proceeds to examine how courts should analyze unwelcomeness so
as to best serve this purpose.
Susan Estrich, a staunch opponent of the unwelcome require-
ment, still recognizes that the requirement’s strongest justification
is in assuring that “consensual workplace sex does not provide the
basis for a civil action.”29 The EEOC justifies the requirement in a
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
24. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.
27. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
28. For example, a wrongful death plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s conduct,
which resulted in the victim’s death, was unwelcome.
29. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 831 (1991); see also Delaria v. Am.
Gen. Fin., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1050, 1058-59 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (“[T]he rule that the sexual or
sex-based behavior at work is unwelcome ensures consensual work place sex does not provide
the basis for a civil action.”); Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims
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similar manner.30 The EEOC does not want the sexual harassment
cause of action to “become a tool by which one party to a consensual
relationship may punish the other.”31 This is possible because
“sexual advances and innuendo are ambiguous: depending on their
context, they may be intended by the initiator, and perceived by the
recipient, as denigrating or complimentary, as threatening or
welcome, as malevolent or innocuous.”32
From these excerpts, it may appear that the EEOC is worried
about false claims being brought by those who actually did not
subjectively experience a hostile or abusive work environment.
From this perspective, the unwelcome requirement is a safeguard
against such plaintiffs who are somehow able to prove the subjective
hostile or abusive element of their claim, by requiring these
plaintiffs to make clear to the harasser at the time the incident
occurs that his conduct is unwelcome. Placing such a burden on
plaintiffs decreases the probability that a plaintiff who has made a
prima facie case for a hostile work environment was actually
engaged in a consensual relationship at the time of the alleged
harassment, and when the relationship went downhill, decided to
sue her employer.
Viewing the unwelcome requirement in this way, however,
renders it redundant. If the EEOC believed that every time
plaintiffs met the subjective branch of the hostile or abusive element
they actually did subjectively experience their environment as
hostile or abusive, there would be no worry about plaintiffs bringing
false claims to punish the other party for conduct they perceived as
and the Unwelcome Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125, 160-61 (1995) (“It is
a simple mechanism for recognizing that consensual sexual relationships between employees
do exist, and that they alone do not support Title VII claims.”); Catherine M. Maraist,
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton: An Analysis of the Subjective Perception Test Required by
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 57 LA. L. REV. 1343, 1365 (1997) (“The ‘unwelcomeness’
requirement was included to protect both men and women who engage in consensual sexual
relationships at work. If this protection is eliminated, then the sexual harassment claim could
potentially exist in any relationship.”).
30. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae at 13, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). 
31. Id. at 15; see also Maraist, supra note 29, at 1365 (“[T]he sexual harassment claim
could become a retaliatory tool for the jilted lover or the fired employee. Co-employees who
were not the targets of ‘harassing’ conduct could sue when they realize that other co-workers
are recovering for offensive conduct (and not that they were harassed).”).
32. Brief for the United States, supra note 30.
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“complimentary” or “innocuous.”33 In such cases, the subjective
hostile or abusive element would be sufficient to dismiss such
claims.
If the unwelcome requirement is intended to ensure that
“consensual workplace sex does not provide the basis for a civil
action,”34 then the worry is that the hostile environment cause of
action may provide damages for conduct that was in fact con-
sensual,35 or welcome. The hostile environment cause of action
should provide recovery only for those plaintiffs who can show that
this particular encounter, or series of encounters, with the accused
was not consensual.
This Note considers the purpose of the unwelcome requirement
not as a means of testing whether the plaintiff actually subjectively
perceived her environment as hostile or abusive, but as a means of
ensuring that there is recovery only when the conduct was unwel-
come. Courts can analyze unwelcomeness in a manner that serves
this purpose of protecting consensual relationships while simulta-
neously not conflating it with the subjective hostile or abusive
element.36 Accordingly, courts should analyze unwelcomeness in a
way that both avoids redundancy and protects consensual workplace
relationships.37 The plaintiff ’s subjective perspective and the sub-
jective accused and reasonable accused perspectives satisfy these
two conditions.38 As this note will demostrate, because the reason-
able accused perspective better serves one of Title VII’s goals of
ridding the workplace of sex-based discrimination, courts should
apply this perspective when analyzing unwelcomeness.39
33. See id.
34. Estrich, supra note 29, at 831.
35. The term “consensual relationship,” as used in this Note, includes ones that involve
dating or intimacy outside the workplace, as well as relationships in which certain conduct
is accepted between friends.
36. See infra Part III.A.3-4.
37. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 760-62 (2002).
38. See infra Part III.A.1, III.A.3-4.
39. See infra Part III.A.5.
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II. THE SYSTEM AND ITS CRITICISMS
Part II of this Note describes the courts of appeals’ current tests
for analyzing unwelcomeness and common criticisms of the un-
welcome requirement. After laying out the current state of affairs
and the legitimate concerns associated with how courts implement
the unwelcome requirement in Part II, Part III develops a frame-
work for supervisor-subordinate hostile environment claims that
responds to each of the criticisms outlined below.
A. Current Tests for Unwelcomeness
Other than stating that courts should determine whether conduct
is unwelcome by looking at whether the plaintiff “by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome,”40 the
Supreme Court has not explicitly told lower courts from which
perspective the analysis should take place.41 One can analyze the
unwelcome requirement from multiple perspectives. The court could
ask whether the plaintiff subjectively perceived the accused’s
conduct as unwelcome, or whether a reasonable person in her
position would perceive the conduct as unwelcome. The court could
also ask whether this particular accused person knew that his
conduct was unwelcome, or whether a reasonable person in his
position would have known that the plaintiff did not welcome his
conduct.42 Due to the lack of direction from the Supreme Court, the
courts of appeals have developed their own tests, most of which do
not invoke a clear perspective.43
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits require
that the conduct “be unwelcome in the sense that the employee did
not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded
the conduct as undesirable or offensive.”44 The EEOC also adopted
40. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
41. The Supreme Court has not even explicitly said the unwelcome requirement should
be part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case.
42. Chambers, supra note 37, at 757 n.113.
43. See id.
44. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Jones v.
Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
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this standard in its 1990 Guidelines on Sexual Harassment.45 The
latter part of this standard—“the employee regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive”46—appears to invoke the plaintiff’s
subjective perspective. The first part, however—“the employee did
not solicit or incite it”47—appears to invoke the perspective of the
accused, or a reasonable person in the accused’s position.
The First and Eighth Circuits have standards similar to the Fifth
and Eleventh, except they replace “incite” with “invite.”48 The First
Circuit, however, recognizes that the Supreme Court has left the
question of perspective open.49 In Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, the First Circuit described a dilemma that both the plaintiff
and the accused face: “the man may not realize that his comments
are offensive, and the woman may be fearful of criticizing her
supervisor.”50 The First Circuit attempts to solve this problem by
requiring the fact-finder to take both parties’ perspectives into
account and by placing a burden on both parties—on the accused to
pay attention to the plaintiff ’s signals, and on the plaintiff to make
clear that the accused’s conduct is unwelcome.51 This court also
recognizes, however, that in some cases a plaintiff ’s “consistent
failure to respond to suggestive comments or gestures may be
sufficient to communicate that the man’s conduct is unwelcome.”52
Although it may seem that the First Circuit analyzes unwel-
comeness from both parties’ perspectives, this last comment of the
Lipsett court demonstrates that its analysis really comes down to
what the plaintiff “communicated” to the accused; that is, whether
the accused, or a reasonable person in the accused’s position, knew
or should have known that the plaintiff did not welcome his conduct.
The Seventh Circuit holds that if the plaintiff “demonstrates by
word or deed that the ‘harassment’ is welcome ... it is not harass-
45. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NOTICE NO. 915-50, POLICY GUIDANCE ON




48. Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990); Moylan v. Maries
Cnty., 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
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ment.”53 This standard is similar to the Meritor standard, which
requires courts to analyze whether the plaintiff “by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.”54 A
standard described in this manner is unhelpful because it is still
unclear which perspective courts should analyze. The Seventh
Circuit could mean that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
conduct is welcome either to a reasonable person or to this particu-
lar accused person. In addition, the Seventh Circuit provides no
further guidance on what is required for the plaintiff to satisfy the
unwelcome requirement, as opposed to simply stating that when the
plaintiff demonstrates that conduct is welcome, it is not harassment.
The Second, Fourth, Tenth, Federal, and D.C. Circuits have
adopted the unwelcome requirement, but have not been clear
regarding the question of perspective.55 The Sixth Circuit has
defined unwelcomeness as conduct by the accused that was “not
solicited and not desired,”56 again leaving the question of perspective
open. The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, has chosen the perspective of
the subjective plaintiff.57 It explains that because “whether one
person welcomes another’s sexual proposition depends on the
invitee’s individual circumstances and feelings,” welcomeness is
“inherently subjective.”58
Finally, the Third Circuit has declined to impose the unwelcome
requirement on plaintiffs59 based on a different reading of the EEOC
guidelines. The guidelines state that “[u]nwelcome sexual advances
... constitute sexual harassment.”60 Other circuits read this state-
ment as suggesting that the plaintiff must prove as part of her
prima facie case that the accused’s conduct was unwelcome. In
53. Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008-09 (7th Cir.
1994).
54. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
55. Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Baker v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1345 (10th Cir. 1990); Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890
F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987);
Carosella v. U.S. Postal Serv., 816 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
56. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 1987).
57. EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010).
58. Id. Note, however, that the Ninth Circuit analyzes the unwelcome requirement from
an objective perspective for purposes of determining an employer’s liability for failing to stop
the unwelcome conduct. Id. at 998.
59. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980).
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contrast, the Third Circuit reads this statement as a mere example
of how sex-based harassment can violate Title VII.61
B. Criticism of the Unwelcome Requirement
Academics have long criticized the unwelcome requirement and
its application in the various circuits outlined above. This Section
outlines the critiques to which this Note later responds with a
framework for analyzing unwelcomeness in the supervisor-subordi-
nate context.
1. Presumptively Welcome vs. Presumptively Unwelcome
Imposing the burden of proving unwelcomeness on the plaintiff,
in addition to the hostile or abusive element, creates the default
position that an accused’s conduct, though objectively viewed as
creating a hostile or abusive work environment, is welcome until
proven otherwise by the plaintiff. Scholars often argue that such
conduct should be presumptively unwelcome.62 Because few people,
if any, would welcome conduct that is the subject of sexual harass-
ment claims, the burden should be placed on the employer to prove
that the accused’s conduct was welcome, instead of on the plaintiff
to prove that it was unwelcome.63 One critic draws a comparison
between the expectation in a doctor-patient relationship and the
expectation in a supervisor-subordinate relationship: “A doctor may
be required, by tort law, to secure affirmative and informed assent
before he lays his hands on a woman; but a boss may freely touch
any woman subordinate, until and unless she expresses, through
her conduct, her nonassent.”64
61. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485 n.6. But see Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014)
(“Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on ... sex.”).
62. See, e.g., B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims,
73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993); L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment Is Gender Harassment,
43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 587 (1995); Anne C. Levy, Sexual Harassment Cases in the 1990s:
“Backlashing” the “Backlash” Through Title VII, 56 ALB. L. REV. 1, 34 (1992).
63. See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81
VA. L. REV. 273, 339 (1995).
64. Estrich, supra note 29, at 828.
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Many who support shifting the burden of proving unwelcomeness
from the plaintiff to the employer justify the shift by arguing that
imposing the unwelcome requirement on plaintiffs invokes a false
stereotype that people, largely women, welcome such conduct in the
workplace.65 Advocates of this view argue that the elements of a
hostile environment claim should not be based on “men’s beliefs
about women’s behavior”66 and whether the plaintiff “ ‘asked for’
it.”67 In advocating for a shift of the burden of proof to align more
accurately with the realities of a workplace environment, one
commentator points to studies indicating that women are more
likely than men to perceive sexual conduct in the workplace as
“threatening and insulting,” whereas men are more likely to view it
as “flattering.”68 Alternatively, critics argue that the default position
rests on the unjustified assumption that people will use the sexual
harassment cause of action as a way to exact some sort of punish-
ment on their former partner.69
65. See, e.g., Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual
Harassment Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
131, 134 (2008); Levy, supra note 62, at 34; Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Employers as Vigilant
Chaperones Armed with Dating Waivers: The Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer
Liability in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Law, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 325, 349 (1999); Maria L. Ontiveros, Fictionalizing Harassment—Disclosing the Truth, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1393 (1995) (reviewing MICHAEL CRICHTON, DISCLOSURE (1994) and CELIA
MORRIS, BEARING WITNESS: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND BEYOND—EVERYWOMAN’S STORY
(1994)).
66. Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The “Unwelcome” Requirement in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1588 (1992).
67. Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” from the Outside: Using Case
Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 65
(2007).
68. Christina A. Bull, Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual
Harassment Plaintiff ’s Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
41 UCLA L. REV. 117, 119, 147 (1993); Hébert, supra note 62, at 578-79 (1995).
69. See, e.g., Michael D. Vhay, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment
of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 344-45 (1988); see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text. One critic describes the unwelcome requirement as arising out of an
“unsubstantiated fear of spurned lovers’ suits amount[ing] to judicial resistance to the
purposes of the discrimination laws.” Vhay, supra, at 345.
1976 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1961
2. Plaintiff’s Conduct vs. Accused’s Conduct
Scholars also criticize the unwelcome requirement’s focus on the
plaintiff ’s conduct instead of the accused’s conduct.70 The require-
ment’s opponents often analogize it to the consent standard in
rape:71 “If a victim drinks, wears tight clothes, or walks unaccompa-
nied at a late hour, the rape is her own fault; indeed, it was not
‘rape’ at all. An employee wearing a short skirt and a snug sweater
is similarly blameworthy when the boss makes passes, or worse.”72
One critic describes it as an attempt to blame the victim for the
accused’s conduct, just as criminal defendants attempt to avoid a
rape conviction by shifting the focus to the victim’s conduct.73
3. Putting the Plaintiff on Trial
A third criticism of the unwelcome requirement, which in part
combines the first two above, stems from the Supreme Court’s
statement in Meritor that the plaintiff ’s “sexually provocative
speech or dress” is “obviously relevant” to the unwelcomeness
inquiry.74 Some claim that the requirement puts the plaintiff on
trial75 by permitting information regarding her past and current
sexual activity to be introduced for everyone to hear.76 This practice
thus discourages plaintiffs with a legitimate claim of a hostile work
environment from bringing suit.77 One scholar points to the “private
70. See, e.g., Steven L. Wellborn, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fate
of Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 694 (1999)
(“First, as a part of the discrimination element, unwelcomeness focuses on the wrong party.
Instead of focusing on the actions of the perpetrator to determine if they are the product of
discrimination, it focuses on the reactions of the victim.”).
71. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 29, at 827, 830; Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 350;
Miranda Oshige, What’s Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 581-82 (1995).
72. George, supra note 62, at 29.
73. Bull, supra note 68, at 119, 147.
74. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
75. See, e.g., Hébert, supra note 62, at 579; Casey J. Wood, Note, “Inviting Sexual
Harassment”: The Absurdity of the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Harassment Law, 38
BRANDEIS L.J. 423, 428-29 (2000).
76. See, e.g., Oshige, supra note 71, at 577 (“The kind of evidence the Court has held as
admissible to rebut the plaintiff ’s assertion of ‘unwelcomeness’ is every feminist’s
nightmare.”).
77. See, e.g., id. at 581.
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nature of sexual offense cases such as rape and sexual harassment”
in advocating for a position that protects the victim “from further
trauma and degradation” when the victim seeks recovery for the
wrong committed.78 To avoid the trauma of having her speech, dress,
and the identity of her sexual partners79 presented as evidence for
the fact that she “welcomed” the accused’s conduct, a plaintiff who
would otherwise have a legitimate claim for a hostile work environ-
ment does not seek recovery. In such cases, there are no repercus-
sions for the accused’s actions.80
4. Redundancy of the Unwelcome Requirement
A fourth criticism of the unwelcome requirement is its apparent
redundancy. To state a claim for sexual harassment under a hostile
environment theory, the plaintiff also must show that the accused’s
conduct created a hostile or abusive work environment both
subjectively and objectively.81 Many commentators find a scenario
in which someone welcomes objectively hostile or abusive conduct
unrealistic.82 They claim that “[o]nly a ‘hellish’ working environment
meets the standards ... for [a] hostile work environment. Common
sense and reasonable judgment will preclude any danger of a truly
consensual relationship being labeled as ‘harassment.’”83 Further,
one scholar notes that courts take into account how the victim
78. Wood, supra note 75, at 428.
79. See Estrich, supra note 29, at 828.
80. For various views on the effect the 1994 amendments of Federal Rule of Evidence 412,
commonly known as the rape shield law, had on ameliorating the susceptibility of the
unwelcome requirement to this objection, see generally Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare:
A Procedural Rule that Cannot Adequately Protect Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs from
Embarrassing Exposure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 125 (1998); Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving
Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims
Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155 (1995);
Jacqueline H. Sloan, Extending Rape Shield Protection to Sexual Harassment Actions: New
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 25 SW. U. L. REV.
363 (1996); Lauren M. Hilsheimer, Note, But She Spoke in an Un-ladylike Fashion!: Parsing
Through the Standards of Evidentiary Admissibility in Civil Lawsuits After the 1994
Amendments to the Rape Shield Law, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 661 (2009); Joan S. Weiner, Note,
Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for
Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (1997).
81. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
82. See, e.g., Oshige, supra note 71, at 577.
83. Wood, supra note 75, at 430.
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perceived her environment in the hostile or abusive analysis, which
necessarily involves considering whether she welcomed the conduct;
this fact renders the unwelcome requirement redundant.84
5. The Effect of a Power Differential
A fifth objection to the unwelcome requirement arises when the
accused has power over the plaintiff in the workplace. Some argue
that in these cases the plaintiff does not feel comfortable conveying
that the accused’s conduct is unwelcome for fear of the potential
repercussions.85
One scholar compares sexual harassment to rape in this context,
stating that one of the reasons many states have shifted the burden
of proving consent in rape to the defendant is because of the
difficulty of proving lack of consent, “particularly [in] those [situa-
tions] in which the accused holds an advantage over his victim.”
This rationale is applicable in the sexual harassment context.86 And
when the plaintiff does not affirmatively object to the accused’s
conduct, the accused and courts can interpret this as the plaintiff
welcoming or consenting to the conduct,87 when really the plaintiff
“is choosing the lesser of two evils: enduring harassment or
suffering the consequences.”88 Moreover, one critic suggests that to
84. Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 347; see also Maraist, supra note 29, at 1361-62
(“Although it was not expressed in Harris, the subjective prong also influences whether
conduct will be perceived as ‘unwelcome’ or not.... [T]he subjective perception of the
offensiveness of the behavior can be seen to some extent as co-extensive with the requirement
that the conduct was unwelcome.”).
85. See, e.g., Hébert, supra note 62, at 587; Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 348-50 (“Those
victims who are most intimidated and remain silent will have the most difficulty offering proof
that they outwardly and objectively communicated their disapproval.... They face tremendous
pressure to keep their jobs and often fear being terminated or otherwise retaliated against for
resisting a supervisor’s sexual conduct.”); Oshige, supra note 71, at 578-79 (“The woman
therefore faces the dilemma of rejecting her boss convincingly enough to satisfy the court’s
demands while taking care not to be so forceful as to risk retribution.... Women who rely on
their paychecks to support themselves and their families cannot go to great lengths to
communicate the unwelcomeness of discriminatory behavior.”). One scholar even contends
that “there is no such thing as truly ‘welcome’ sex between a male boss and a female employee
who needs her job. And if there is, then the women who welcome it will not be bringing
lawsuits in any event.” Estrich, supra note 29, at 831.
86. Vhay, supra note 69, at 346.
87. Chambers, supra note 37, at 780; Juliano, supra note 66, at 1575.
88. Vhay, supra note 69, at 346.
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the extent the Supreme Court views a “personal vendetta” against
someone as a nondiscriminatory reason for termination,89 stirring
the pot by making clear one’s discomfort with her supervisor’s
conduct can result in the loss of her job with no legal recourse.90
Some opponents of the requirement also argue that a plaintiff in
a less powerful position than the accused may not only be unwilling
to put her job at risk to ensure the accused knows that she does not
welcome the conduct, but she may also be unable to communicate
unwelcomeness because of the “debilitating effects of sexual
harassment.”91 Opponents challenge the idea that silence consti-
tutes welcomeness. They argue that a court should view a plaintiff’’s
silence as indicative of a power differential between the two parties
and inquire into why the plaintiff remained silent before equating
silence with welcomeness.92
This Note most directly addresses the last two criticisms of the
requirement, which actually assume two different perspectives of
unwelcomeness. The objection that the requirement is redundant
because of the hostile or abusive element requires assuming that
courts view the unwelcome requirement from the plaintiff’s per-
spective. If viewed from the plaintiff ’s perspective, the analysis
entails whether the plaintiff welcomed the accused’s conduct, or
whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have
welcomed the conduct. Because courts already analyze the hostile
or abusive element from the plaintiff ’s perspective, critics claim the
unwelcome requirement is unnecessary because the hostile or
abusive element does the same work.93
In contrast, the last objection that the requirement does not take
into account a possible power differential between the plaintiff and
the accused—that the plaintiff may be unwilling or unable to
communicate unwelcomeness to a supervisor—requires assuming
that courts view the unwelcome requirement from the accused’s per-
spective. Analyzing unwelcomeness from the accused’s perspective
89. Chambers, supra note 37, at 780 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993) and Jennings v. Tinley Park Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 864 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1988)).
90. Id.
91. Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 351.
92. Mary Jo Shaney, Note, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1119-20 (1986).
93. See, e.g., Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 347.
1980 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1961
entails asking whether the accused perceived the plaintiff as
welcoming his conduct, or whether a reasonable person in the
accused’s position would have perceived the plaintiff as welcoming
his conduct. Critics argue that it is unfair to require a subordinate
to communicate to a supervisor that the supervisor’s conduct is
unwelcome when there could be legal repercussions, and the
subordinate may even be unable to communicate such information.94
III. RECOMMENDED FRAMEWORK FOR UNWELCOMENESS
The federal courts of appeals clearly have not decided on a
consistent perspective from which to analyze unwelcomeness.
Further, two of the most common objections to the unwelcome
requirement assume two different perspectives.95 Part III of this
Note analyzes the various perspectives from which courts could
analyze unwelcomeness and explains which perspectives satisfy two
conditions: (1) the perspective does not render the requirement
redundant of any other element, and (2) the perspective enables the
unwelcome requirement to serve its purpose—to protect consensual
workplace relationships in the sense of providing recovery for only
nonconsensual acts. The plaintiff ’s subjective perspective and the
subjective accused and reasonable accused perspectives satisfy these
two important conditions; but the reasonable accused perspective
most effectively furthers one of the goals of Title VII—to rid the
workplace of sex-based discrimination. Consequently, this Note
advocates for application of the reasonable accused perspective
when analyzing unwelcomeness. Finally, this Note applies this
particular conception of unwelcomeness to the supervisor-subordi-
nate context and recommends a framework that responds to all five
criticisms of the unwelcome requirement outlined above in the
supervisor-subordinate context.
94. See id. at 350-51.
95. See supra Part II.B.5.
2014] UNWELCOME REQUIREMENT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1981
A. Different Perspectives of the Unwelcome Requirement
1. Plaintiff’s Subjective Perspective
One perspective from which to view the unwelcome requirement
is the plaintiff ’s subjective perspective.96 This entails deciding
whether the plaintiff subjectively perceived the accused’s conduct as
unwelcome—whether Sarah perceived the sexually explicit jokes
made by her supervisor, Andrew, as unwelcome. For this conception
not to be redundant of the subjective hostile or abusive element, it
must be possible for someone to actually welcome conduct that she
subjectively perceives as creating a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment. This construction of the requirement draws much criticism
because it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the subjective
hostile or abusive element can be met and the unwelcome require-
ment not be met.97
Nonetheless, it is certainly possible to imagine someone welcom-
ing conduct that she perceives as causing her work environment to
be hostile or abusive. It has been reported that “[u]p to 14% of
American males and 11% of American females have engaged in
some form of sadomasochistic (BDSM or SM) sexual behavior.”98
BDSM is commonly defined as the “knowing use of psychological
dominance and submission, and/or physical bondage, and/or pain,
and/or related practices in a safe, legal, consensual manner in order
for the participants to experience erotic arousal and/or personal
growth.”99 Other studies have reported lower numbers, such as 2.2
percent of men and 1.3 percent of women stating that they had
engaged in BDSM activity in the previous year.100 The Kinsey
Institute New Report on Sex, published in 1990, stated that “5 per-
cent to 10 percent of the U.S. population engages in sadomasochism
96. Henry Chambers states that this perspective is appropriate if the focus of sexual
harassment suits is harm to the plaintiff. Chambers, supra note 37, at 757.
97. See supra Part II.B.4.
98. Keely Kolmes et al., Investigating Bias in Psychotherapy with BDSM Clients, 50 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 301, 302 (2006) (citing SAMUEL S. JANUS & CYNTHIA L. JANUS, THE JANUS
REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1993)).
99. Id. (quoting JAY WISEMAN, SM 101: A REALISTIC INTRODUCTION 10 (2d ed. 1996)).
100. Juliet Richters et al., Demographic and Psychosocial Features of Participants in
Bondage and Discipline, “Sadomasochism” or Dominance and Submission (BDSM): Data from
a National Survey, 5 J. SEXUAL MED. 1660, 1662 (2008).
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for sexual pleasure on at least an occasional basis,” and that “many
more individuals prefer to play the masochist’s role than the
sadist’s.”101 Thus, at least a minority of individuals, although a
small minority, welcome occasionally being physically or emotion-
ally “abused” in their private sexual lives.
Additionally, many people engage in romantic relationships with
coworkers, supervisors, or subordinates in their workplace. Accord-
ing to CareerBuilder.com’s annual survey of more than 4,000
workers nationwide in 2012, “[t]hirty-nine percent of workers said
they have dated a co-worker at least once over the course of their
career.”102 Similarly, in a study cited by Business News Daily in July
2012, 57 percent of employees in thirty-two countries “acknowledged
that romantic relationships do occasionally happen in the work-
place.”103
Given the frequency of workplace relationships, as well as the fact
that at least a small minority of individuals welcome conduct in
their sexual relationships that is subjectively perceived as hostile or
abusive, it is at least possible that someone engaged in a workplace
relationship would welcome conduct in the workplace that both
objectively and subjectively renders their work environment hostile
or abusive. If Sarah and Andrew were dating, Sarah may welcome
conduct that renders her interactions with Andrew hostile or
abusive. The unwelcome requirement thus would not be redundant
when viewed from the plaintiff ’s subjective perspective because it
is possible to imagine at least some cases in which the subjective
hostile or abusive element is satisfied and the unwelcome require-
ment is not.104
101. JUNE M. REINISCH & RUTH BEASLEY, THE KINSEY INSTITUTE NEW REPORT ON SEX 162-
63 (Debra Kent ed., 1990).
102. Three in Ten Workers Who Had Office Romances Married Their Co-Worker, Finds
Annual CareerBuilder Valentine’s Day Survey, CAREERBUILDER (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.
careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?sd=2/13/2013&siteid=cbpr&sc_c
mp1=cb_pr40_&id=pr40&ed=12/31/2013.
103. Ned Smith, Where Office Romances Blossom Most, BUSINESSNEWSDAILY (July 10,
2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2819-workers-support-workplace-rom
ance.html.
104. Chambers provides the following example to demonstrate that hostile or abusive
conduct may be unwelcome in another sense: “Assume that an employee makes a sexual
advance toward a co-worker in a particularly inappropriate manner. The style of the advance,
and hence the advance itself, may be offensive even if the sentiment underlying the advance,
and therefore the advance itself, was arguably not unwelcome.” Chambers, supra note 37, at
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This conception of the unwelcome requirement also furthers its
purported goal of protecting consensual workplace relation-
ships—providing recovery only for nonconsensual, unwelcome acts.
Regardless of which perspective of the unwelcome requirement
courts apply, the heart of the matter is exactly what this perspective
would require the plaintiff to prove—whether she subjectively
welcomed the accused’s conduct. As this Note later explains,
however, the reasonable accused perspective satisfies this require-
ment while also serving to more effectively rid the workplace of sex-
based discrimination.
2. Reasonable Plaintiff Perspective
Courts also could analyze the unwelcome requirement from the
perspective of a reasonable plaintiff. This requires deciding whether
a reasonable person in Sarah’s position could have perceived
Andrew’s sexually explicit jokes as unwelcome. This conception,
however, is redundant of the objective hostile or abusive element of
the hostile environment claim. If it were reasonable for the plaintiff
to experience a hostile or abusive environment when the accused
conducted himself in a particular manner, then it also would be
reasonable for her not to welcome such conduct. If it were reason-
able for Sarah to perceive her work environment as hostile or
abusive when Andrew made such jokes, it also would be reasonable
for someone in Sarah’s position not to welcome Andrew’s jokes.
Moreover, the reasonable plaintiff standard does not further the
goal of protecting consensual relationships. Although it would be
reasonable for someone in Sarah’s position not to welcome Andrew’s
jokes, it is still possible that Sarah herself welcomed them. If courts
761. This example is unpersuasive because it is not the sentiment behind the conduct that
forms the basis of a hostile environment claim, but rather the conduct that results. A plaintiff
does not state a claim for sexual harassment if she has proof that someone had a particular
thought that she found unwelcome, but that did not actually result in unwelcome conduct.
Further, even if a plaintiff were to welcome a coworker or supervisor asking her out on a date,
or if she were already dating someone in the workplace, this should not permit the accused
to engage in any type of behavior in the workplace. If the unwelcome requirement is intended
to protect consensual relationships in the workplace, it should aim to protect not just
consensual relationships that begin in the workplace, but also to protect consensual
relationships in the workplace—how two people have agreed to interact in the workplace,
regardless of whether they engage in different behavior outside the workplace.
1984 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1961
were to adopt the reasonable plaintiff conception of unwelcomeness,
the unwelcome requirement would be satisfied when the conduct
between the two parties was actually consensual, negating the
requirement’s purpose.
The reasonable plaintiff perspective of the unwelcome require-
ment does not satisfy either of the two conditions necessary for the
requirement to be productive: it is redundant of the objective hostile
or abusive element, and it would not protect consensual workplace
relationships. Accordingly, courts should not analyze unwel-
comeness from the perspective of the reasonable plaintiff.
3. Accused’s Subjective Perspective
Courts could also consider unwelcomeness from the accused’s
subjective perspective.105 This requires asking whether Andrew
subjectively knew that Sarah did not welcome his jokes. This
conception is not redundant of any other element of the hostile
environment cause of action because the unwelcome requirement
would be the only element in which the accused’s perspective is
considered. It is quite easy to think of scenarios in which the
accused believed his conduct toward the plaintiff was not unwel-
come when the plaintiff subjectively, and reasonably, perceived his
conduct as hostile or abusive—the accused could simply be incredi-
bly obtuse.106
This conception of the requirement also would satisfy the purpose
of ensuring that the hostile environment cause of action does not
serve as the basis for recovery in a consensual relationship. This is
true whether the accused’s conduct is considered “severe” or
“pervasive.” If Sarah were required to ensure that Andrew knew she
did not welcome his jokes before establishing a claim for a hostile
work environment, any pervasive continuation of this conduct in
response to such knowledge would clearly not be consensual. If,
instead, Andrew were to commit what a court would consider one
“severe” act and Sarah took steps immediately thereafter to ensure
105. Chambers states that this perspective is relevant if the focus of sexual harassment
suits is the accused’s intent to harass. Chambers, supra note 37, at 757.
106. See id. at 759.
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Andrew knew such conduct was unwelcome, then clearly Andrew’s
one severe act was not consensual.
The accused’s subjective perspective of the unwelcome require-
ment satisfies both conditions: it is not redundant of any other
element of the hostile environment cause of action, and it serves the
purpose of the unwelcome requirement—to protect consensual
workplace relationships. As explained in the next Section, the
reasonable accused perspective also satisfies these two conditions.
4. Reasonable Accused Perspective
The last perspective from which courts could analyze unwel-
comeness is that of a reasonable person in the accused’s position.
For this conception not to be redundant, it must be possible for
someone to subjectively, and reasonably, perceive the accused’s
conduct as creating a hostile or abusive environment, while at the
same time having a reasonable accused person not know that his
conduct is unwelcome.
If Sarah had made sexually explicit jokes with Andrew in the
past, or if the two were involved in an intimate relationship outside
of the workplace in which Sarah welcomed hostile or abusive
behavior from Andrew, he could reasonably think that Sarah would
continue to welcome this type of behavior at work, when actually
Sarah’s preferences have changed and she provides no external
indication of her discomfort. If Sarah were to laugh along with
Andrew’s jokes every day, but secretly is disturbed by them, or
displays no sign indicating her position either way, Andrew could
reasonably believe that Sarah welcomed his jokes. He could
reasonably hold this view despite the fact that Sarah actually and
reasonably perceives his actions as hostile or abusive. Accordingly,
the reasonable accused perspective of the unwelcome requirement
is not redundant of any other element of the hostile environment
cause of action.
The reasonable accused perspective also furthers the unwelcome
requirement’s goal of protecting consensual workplace relationships,
whether the accused’s conduct is characterized as “severe” or
“pervasive.” If Sarah were required to communicate to Andrew such
that a reasonable person in his position would know that she did not
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welcome his jokes, any pervasive continuation of such jokes would
clearly not be consensual. Similarly, if Andrew were to commit one
act that a court would consider “severe,” and if Sarah immediately
thereafter ensured that a reasonable person in Andrew’s position
knew that such conduct was unwelcome, then clearly Andrew’s one
severe act was not consensual.
This is only the case, however, if the court takes into account the
accused’s knowledge of the plaintiff ’s personal preferences in its
determination of what a reasonable person in the accused’s position
would know.107 Applying the above example with Sarah and Andrew
more generally, if the plaintiff was engaged in a romantic relation-
ship with the accused and welcomed hostile or abusive conduct by
habitually behaving in a certain way when the accused acted in
such a manner, the accused would be reasonable in expecting that
she would continue to welcome this behavior if the plaintiff said
nothing to the contrary and continued to behave in her typical
manner in response to his objectively hostile or abusive conduct.
Making clear to a reasonable person in the accused’s position that
his conduct is unwelcome would mean that the plaintiff must ensure
that a reasonable person, with knowledge of her prior preferences,
would know that she now does not welcome such conduct at work.
Analyzed in this manner, this conception of the unwelcome
requirement is not redundant of any other element of the hostile
environment cause of action, and it furthers the requirement’s
purpose—to protect consensual relationships.
Although three of the four possible perspectives satisfy both
conditions, the next Section favors the reasonable accused perspec-
tive because it best serves one of the goals of Title VII.
5. Choosing a Perspective
The plaintiff ’s subjective perspective and the subjective accused
and reasonable accused perspectives of the unwelcome requirement
satisfy two important conditions: they are not redundant of any
other element of the hostile environment cause of action, and they
serve the requirement’s purpose—to protect consensual relation-
107. See Chambers, supra note 37, at 758 (“[T]he harasser [must] know that the conduct
is unwelcome by the target before the conduct is deemed harassing and actionable.”).
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ships. To decide which perspective courts should adopt, this Section
explains which perspective best serves the goal of the Title VII
sexual harassment claim.
The overarching goal of Title VII sexual harassment claims is to
eliminate sex-based discrimination from the workplace.108 One way
to serve this goal, when choosing from various standards that all
satisfy the same basic requirements, is to make it easier for
plaintiffs to state claims for such discrimination. Certainly plaintiffs
should not have such an easy time stating a sexual harassment
claim that the conduct serving as the basis for damages includes
conduct that was welcome—conduct that occurred in the course of
a consensual relationship. But that is precisely the purpose of the
unwelcome requirement—to ensure that the only conduct found to
be sexual harassment is conduct that was not performed in the
course of a consensual relationship.109 This Note has already shown
that the three remaining perspectives further the goal of maintain-
ing consensual relationships in the workplace.
The easiest standard from the plaintiff ’s point of view would be
the plaintiff ’s subjective perspective. In that case, the plaintiff
would need to prove only that she subjectively perceived the
accused’s conduct as unwelcome. In contrast, it would be consider-
ably more difficult to prove that the accused himself knew that his
conduct was unwelcome, even more difficult than proving that a
reasonable person in his position would have known that his
conduct was unwelcome.
For example, imagine Sarah addressing Andrew’s perspective in
court. It would be easier to prove what Andrew should have known
as opposed to what he actually knew, especially when Sarah has
already presented sufficient evidence to prove that a reasonable
person in her position would perceive Andrew’s jokes as creating a
hostile or abusive work environment.110 Thus, of the three remain
108. E.g., Chambers, supra note 37, at 786; Margaret Moore Jackson, A Different Voicing
of Unwelcomeness: Relational Reasoning and Sexual Harassment, 81 N.D. L. REV. 739, 744
(2005).
109. See Chambers, supra note 37, at 733.
110. When the plaintiff has a particular sensitivity about which the accused had
knowledge, it may be easier for the plaintiff to prove that the accused had this particular
knowledge. In this case, however, the objective element of the claim would not be satisfied.
If the plaintiff is particularly sensitive, this means that a reasonable person would not view
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ing perspectives, the subjective accused perspective would impose
the greatest burden on the plaintiff.
Removing the most difficult standard for the plaintiff to satisfy,
the subjective accused perspective, leaves the plaintiff ’s subjective
perspective and the reasonable accused perspective. The plaintiff ’s
subjective perspective would certainly be the easiest for the plaintiff
to satisfy, but one must balance this value with another means of
ridding the workplace of sex-based discrimination: applying the
perspective that would require more dialogue about potentially
harassing behavior at the time it occurs.
Imposing the burden on the plaintiff to make known to a
reasonable person in the accused’s position at the time of the
potentially harassing conduct that his conduct is unwelcome is more
likely to deter him from continuing to engage in such behavior than
if the court imposed no such burden and the plaintiff could prevail
on a hostile environment claim simply by remaining silent. Such a
requirement would encourage victims of harassment to speak up
against the harassment and may result in a more open and
productive dialogue about how one should behave at work. If Sarah
knew that to be successful on a hostile environment claim, she must
let a reasonable person in Andrew’s position know that she does not
welcome his jokes, then he, and others in their office, may then
refrain from telling such jokes to people they know find them
unwelcome.
It would be easier for the plaintiff to prove the unwelcome
requirement analyzed from the perspective of the reasonable
accused than that of the subjective accused. Moreover, the reason-
able accused perspective may result in more dialogue about proper
workplace behavior than the plaintiff’s subjective perspective, which
may then result in less sex-based harassment. Accordingly, courts
should analyze the unwelcome requirement from the reasonable
accused perspective.111
The reasonable accused perspective is consistent with one
aspect112 of the Supreme Court’s characterization of the requirement
this conduct as creating a hostile or abusive work environment.
111. This is the perspective that the First Circuit may apply. See supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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in Meritor. The Court contrasted the question of “voluntariness”
with the question of “unwelcomeness,” stating that “[t]he correct
inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] by her conduct indicated that the
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual
participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.”113 One could
interpret this passage as stating that the plaintiff must “indicate”
that the accused’s conduct is unwelcome—that is, she must let the
accused, or a reasonable person in the accused’s position, know that
she perceives his conduct as unwelcome. Under this framework, the
unwelcome requirement places the burden on the plaintiff to let a
reasonable accused person know that she does not welcome his
conduct.
The reasonable accused perspective is also consistent with courts’
emphasis on objectivity in hostile environment cases. Susan Estrich
notes that “the subjective welcomeness inquiry, gravamen or not, is
fundamentally at odds with all the other elements of the cause of
action. A hostile environment, the courts have consistently held,
must be based on objective criteria, evaluated from an ‘objective’
viewpoint.”114
This perspective also responds to those who believe that the
unwelcome requirement, when viewed from the plaintiff ’s subjective
perspective, is redundant of the subjective hostile or abusive
element. Those unconvinced by the notion that some people may
welcome conduct that renders their work environment hostile or
abusive115 can look at the unwelcome requirement from the
reasonable accused perspective as merely adding an additional
requirement to the hostile or abusive analysis. Under that concep-
tion, the plaintiff must show that she subjectively and reasonably
perceived, and that a reasonable person in the accused’s position
would perceive, the accused’s conduct as hostile or abusive, or
unwelcome.
Viewed in this way, “hostile or abusive” and “unwelcome” are
equivalent because they yield the same results. The question wheth-
er a reasonable person in the accused’s position would think that
the plaintiff welcomes the accused’s conduct is equivalent to asking
113. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
114. Estrich, supra note 29, at 833.
115. See supra Part II.B.4.
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whether a reasonable person in the accused’s position would view
his conduct as causing a hostile or abusive environment for the
plaintiff. This Note does not advocate for that conception of the
unwelcome requirement. The position developed above maintains
that it is possible for some people to welcome conduct that renders
their environment hostile or abusive when they are engaged in a
romantic relationship with the accused.116 One need not, however,
hold this Note’s position in order to accept the reasonable accused
perspective for the unwelcome requirement because—as required by
both positions—it responds to the criticism that the requirement is
redundant.
The above discussion of the requirement’s various perspectives
and the relationship between the chosen perspective and the
requirement’s purpose should remind courts of the importance of
being clear in explaining which perspective they apply. When courts
remain unclear about the standard for analyzing unwelcomeness,
at best the element is redundant and therefore serves no purpose,
and at worst the courts are not effectively furthering the require-
ment’s goal of protecting consensual workplace relationships or Title
VII’s goal of ridding the workplace of sex-based discrimination. The
Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Federal, and D.C. Circuits,
which have not been clear as to which perspective their jurisdiction
applies, may not be consistently serving the purpose of the unwel-
come requirement or the goals of Title VII.117
Part III of this Note has thus far focused on how courts should
substantively analyze the unwelcome requirement. The rest of Part
III focuses on which party should bear the burden of proving wel-
comeness or unwelcomeness when the accused was the plaintiff’s
supervisor at the time of the alleged harassment. When the accused
was not the plaintiff ’s supervisor, as long as courts analyze
unwelcomeness from the reasonable accused perspective, the
requirement serves its purpose of protecting consensual relation-
ships and should, at least arguably, remain a part of the plaintiff ’s
prima facie case. The goal of this Note is not to provide an argument
for maintaining the requirement in such cases, but merely to
explain the most productive perspective from which to analyze the
116. See supra Part III.A.1.
117. See supra notes 53, 55-56 and accompanying text.
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requirement if it does remain a part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie
case outside the supervisor-subordinate context.
In the next Section, this Note outlines social science research in
the area of supervisor-subordinate relations. Applying such research
to the reasonable accused perspective adopted above, this Note
explains that it is unreasonable for a supervisor to believe that a
subordinate welcomes severe or pervasive behavior that could
reasonably be viewed as creating a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment without any solicitation of such conduct from the subordinate.
Consequently, this Note advocates for a different unwelcomeness
framework in the supervisor-subordinate context.
B. Research on Supervisor-Subordinate Relations
Many employers have policies limiting employees’ romantic
relationships. Some of these employers acknowledge that one’s
power in the workplace may have an undue influence over
another—a view commonly perceived as inherent in supervisor-
subordinate,118 professor-student, or physician-patient relation-
ships119—and thus have special policies for supervisor-subordinate
romantic relationships.120 Many social science studies on how
subordinates respond to alleged supervisor sexual harassment are
consistent with our current intuitions: when subjected to sexual
harassment, if the perpetrator is one’s supervisor, the subordinate
is less likely to make clear to the harasser that she does not
welcome such conduct, when compared to similar conduct from a
coworker or subordinate of the victim.121 Furthermore, those in
118. In a 2011 study that will be discussed momentarily, Jonathan Kunstman and Jon
Maner begin the study by stating the following: “The notion that power and hierarchy set the
stage for sexual harassment is a near truism.” Jonathan W. Kunstman & Jon K. Maner,
Sexual Overperception: Power, Mating Motives, and Biases in Social Judgment, 100 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 282, 282 (2011).
119. See Lisa Black, Power Imbalance Is Key to Most Policies on Sex, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29,
1998), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-01-29/news/9801290112_1_sexual-harassment-
student-and-professor-consensual; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OF WORKING WOMEN 1-2 (1979) (“Sexual harassment of women in employment is particularly
clear when male superiors on the job coercively initiate unwanted sexual advances to women
employees.”).
120. See Patti A. Giuffre & Kirsten Dellinger, Sexuality in the Workplace: Organizational
Control, Sexual Harassment, and the Pursuit of Pleasure, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 73, 80, 84 (1999).
121. See MACKINNON, supra note 119, at 1-2.
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positions of power are more likely to overperceive another’s sexual
interest in them.122 Such research demonstrates the unreasonable-
ness of requiring a plaintiff to prove unwelcomeness when the
accused was her supervisor at the time of the alleged harassment.
In a series of studies published in 2011, Jonathan Kunstman and
Jon Maner aimed to pinpoint a psychological process that “lead[s]
people in positions of power to view others as objects of sexual
interest.”123 They took sixty-six introductory psychology students
and told one group of students (the power group) that they scored
very well on a quiz that measured leadership ability and that they
would make all decisions regarding the project they would complete
with a partner, as well as the decision regarding the distribution of
the reward received for completing the assignment.124 Another group
of students (the control group) was told that everyone would work
as equals and that the reward would be split equally between them
and their partners.125
At the end of the project, each partner completed a “word-stem
completion task” that required the participants to fill in missing
letters to make a complete word.126 As an example, the participant
would be given the string S _ X and could fill in either I for “SIX,” or
E for “SEX.”127 Those in the power group completed the word-stems
with more sexual words than those in the control group, even after
a five-minute delay in which the participants completed another
unrelated task requiring mental effort.128 This result suggests that
power leads one to have a higher degree of “sexual cognition” and
“sexual motivation,” consistent with Kunstman and Maner’s hypoth-
esis that “power activates a mating motive.”129
In their second study, Kunstman and Maner took fifty-five
introductory psychology students and also assigned them to a power
122. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
123. Kunstman & Maner, supra note 118, at 282.
124. Id. at 285.
125. Id. To ensure any differences in results were not caused by having received positive
feedback, the control group also received positive feedback by being told that they had scored
well on a test measuring creativity. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 285-86 (“[P]articipants in power responded with a slightly greater proportion
of sexual words after a delay ... than when they responded immediately.”).
129. Id. at 286.
2014] UNWELCOME REQUIREMENT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1993
group or control group, giving participants in both groups the same
instructions as in the first study.130 They asked the participants to
watch a two-minute prerecorded video of their partner to assess first
impressions.131 Participants answered sexual interest questions that
included whether they could see their partner as “having romantic
or sexual feelings” for them or “wanting to ask [them] out on a date,”
as well as general likability questions, such as whether they
thought their partner would like them or would be interested in
getting to know them.132 The results showed that although there
were no significant differences between the groups regarding
general likability, those in the power group had enhanced expecta-
tions of sexual interest compared to those in the control group.133
This suggests that the influence of power on one’s perception of
another is “unique to sexual perception and [does] not generalize to
broad perceptions of liking.”134
In a third study, Kunstman and Maner found that “power led
participants to expect high levels of sexual interest from an
opposite-sex partner but only when the partner was single[—] ...
when the sexual goal was attainable.”135 In a fourth study, they
found that even when accounting for any actual sexual interest
displayed in a face-to-face interaction between the partners, those
in the power group still “overperceived” their partner’s sexual
interest in them.136 Just as in the first two studies, these over-
perception effects were present only in relation to perception of
sexual interest and not in relation to perceptions of general
likeability.137
Kunstman and Maner’s work certainly suggests that a different
standard should apply in sexual harassment cases when the alleged
harasser was the plaintiff ’s supervisor as opposed to the plaintiff ’s
coworker or subordinate—at least when the gender-based harass-





134. Id. at 287.
135. Id. at 287-88.
136. Id. at 288-91.
137. Id. at 291.
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requirement from the perspective of the reasonable accused, it is not
reasonable for the plaintiff ’s supervisor to believe in these cases
that the plaintiff welcomes his conduct unless she says otherwise,
because he is likely “overperceiving” the plaintiff ’s sexual interest
in him.
It also is unreasonable for a supervisor to believe that the
plaintiff welcomes his conduct simply because she does not out-
wardly object to it. In a study published in 1995, James Gruber and
Michael Smith interviewed women about their experiences with
harassment in the workplace.138 They found that in the case of
sexual harassment, women were less willing to respond directly to
the harasser if the harasser was a supervisor.139 Of the female
participants, 34.1 percent were willing to respond directly to a
supervisor, compared with 49.1 percent to a coworker and 39.8
percent to a client or customer.140 Gruber and Smith also found that
the women were more likely to quit their job after the harassment
when the harasser was a supervisor (12.5 percent), than when the
harasser was a coworker (1.2 percent) or a client or customer (0.8
percent).141
Interestingly, other differences in work environments did not
predict whether someone was more likely to quit, including “[d]if-
ferences in occupational status or sex composition, workplace sex
composition, number of harassers, policies/procedures, or beliefs
about harassment.”142 Even when the women did report responding
to the supervisor harasser, their response was not as assertive as it
was to someone without supervisory power.143 This work suggests,
138. James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment: A
Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543, 543 (1995).
139. Id. at 554.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 557.
143. Id. at 556. Gruber and Smith also noted that “[m]any women feel that being assertive
is too risky.” Id. at 547 (citing Mary Kay Biaggio et al., Addressing Sexual Harassment:
Strategies for Prevention and Change, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 213
(Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990)). They feel the risk is too great “even when being sexually
assaulted.” Id. (citing Beth E. Schneider, Put Up and Shut Up: Workplace Sexual Assaults,
5 GENDER & SOC’Y 533 (1991)); see also James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women’s Responses
to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource
Models, 67 SOC. SCI. Q. 814, 821 (1986) (“Women who are harassed by their supervisors give
more passive responses ... than those harassed by co-workers.”).
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again, that it is unreasonable for a supervisor to assume his
subordinate welcomes his conduct unless she states otherwise.
Studies differ, however, as to the likelihood that victims of sexual
harassment would make known their discomfort when the harasser
is a supervisor. Numerous studies have found that if the harasser
was the victim’s supervisor or superior, the victim was less likely to
report the harassment144 and would “put up with sexual harassment
from supervisors for long periods of time, perhaps fearful of the job-
related consequences for refusing.”145 In contrast, a 1982 study
“found that if the [harasser] ... was the [victim’s] supervisor, the
[victim] was more likely to report” the conduct.146 This same study
also found, however, that an assertive response had less effect on a
harasser with a higher job status,147 consistent with a study
published in 1986.148 Similarly, a 1997 study found that victims of
a harasser who occupied an authoritative role in the workplace were
more likely to report the conduct and discuss it with others.149 This
144. Barbara A. Gutek, Responses to Sexual Harassment, in GENDER ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 197 (Stuart Oskamp & Mark Costanzo eds., 1993); Kathy Hotelling,
Sexual Harassment: A Problem Shielded by Silence, 69 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 497 (1991);
Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual Harassment: A
Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 687, 704 (1997) (citing Howard Gadlin, Careful
Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment, 7 NEGOT. J. 139 (1991); Susan Littler-Bishop et
al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace as a Function of Initiator's Status: The Case of
Airline Personnel, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 137 (1982)). But see Carol T. Kulik et al., Responses to
Sexual Harassment: The Effect of Perspective, 9 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 37, 40 (1997)
(“[V]ictims were more likely to report harassment when the harasser was a supervisor than
when the harasser was a co-worker.”) (citing Joy A. Livingston, Responses to Sexual
Harassment on the Job: Legal, Organizational, and Individual Actions, 38 J. SOC. ISSUES 5
(1982)).
145. Knapp et al., supra note 144 (quoting R. A. Thacker, Influences upon Propensity to
Display Visible Defensive Responses to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Atlanta, Ga. (1993))); see
also Sandy Welsh et al., Legal Factors, Extra-Legal Factors, or Changes in the Law? Using
Criminal Justice Research to Understand the Resolution of Sexual Harassment Complaints,
49 SOC. PROBS. 605, 608 (2002) (“When the harasser is a supervisor and thereby acts as a
representative of the corporation, the target of the harassment may believe she has less
recourse than if the harasser is a co-worker.”).
146. Knapp et al., supra note 144 (citing Livingston, supra note 144).
147. Id.
148. Kulik et al., supra note 144 (citing Donald E. Maypole, Sexual Harassment of Social
Workers at Work: Injustice Within?, 31 SOC. WORK 29 (1986)).
149. Caroline C. Cochran et al., Predictors of Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attention, 21
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 207, 218 (1997).
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same study found, however, that such victims were “more likely to
ignore, and less likely to confront, the harasser” himself.150
Although the studies analyzing how often victims affirmatively
respond to harassment by supervisors, as compared with coworkers,
are not all in agreement, many studies are consistent with the view
that victims of sexual harassment by a supervisor are less likely to
directly confront the supervisor. Further, Kunstman and Maner’s
work demonstrating that those in power overperceive subordinates’
sexual interest in them also supports the unreasonableness of
supervisors assuming their conduct is welcome unless the subordi-
nate communicates to the contrary. Even absent a complete agree-
ment in the research, the legitimate possibility of a subordinate
hesitating to let her supervisor know that his conduct is unwelcome,
and the subordinate’s reasonable fear of repercussions, place
significant doubt in the possibility of a supervisor reasonably
believing that his otherwise harassing behavior is welcome. It is not
reasonable for a supervisor to believe that his subordinate welcomes
hostile or abusive conduct, even if she gives no indication of her
discomfort with, or objection to, such conduct.
C. Recommended Framework
As argued above, the unwelcome requirement is most productive
when analyzed from the perspective of the reasonable accused.151
Research indicates that a subordinate is less likely to directly
confront a harassing supervisor and that those in power are likely
to overperceive their subordinates’ sexual interest in them. It is
therefore unreasonable for a supervisor to believe, absent some
solicitous behavior on the part of his subordinate, that she welcomes
his severe or pervasive conduct that is reasonably perceived as
creating a hostile or abusive work environment. Accordingly, the
unwelcome requirement in the hostile environment cause of action
should not place the burden on the plaintiff to prove unwelcomeness
when the accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor at the time of the
alleged harassment.
150. Id.
151. See supra Part III.A.5.
2014] UNWELCOME REQUIREMENT IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1997
Applying the reasonable accused perspective of unwelcomeness
to the research in supervisor-subordinate relations, courts should
use the following framework in hostile environment cases when the
accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor at the time of the alleged
harassment. The court should presume that the accused’s conduct
was unwelcome and not require the plaintiff to prove unwelcome-
ness as part of her prima facie case.152 The employer may have an
affirmative defense by which it can show that the plaintiff welcomed
the accused’s conduct by unambiguously soliciting or inviting the
conduct. Such evidence still should be analyzed from the perspective
of the reasonable accused, the perspective that helps protect
consensual workplace relationships and is most productive in
ridding the workplace of sex-based discrimination.
The only evidence the employer may invoke in showing that the
plaintiff unambiguously solicited or invited his conduct is the verbal
communication between the accused and the plaintiff.153 Silence on
the part of the plaintiff in response to the accused’s conduct, or
communication or conduct between the plaintiff and a third party,
is insufficient and irrelevant for this affirmative defense. The
evidentiary limits for the employer’s affirmative defense must be
this strict because research indicates that it is unreasonable for a
supervisor to believe that absent such evidence, his subordinate
welcomes such conduct.154
152. Cf. Susan Grover & Kimberly Piro, Consider the Source: When the Harasser Is the
Boss, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 518-19 (2010) (proposing that courts consider whether the
accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor at the time of the alleged harassment in determining
whether the conduct was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to constitute harassment).
153. See George, supra note 62, at 30 (“[T]he defendant should not be allowed to raise the
defense of unwelcomeness at all unless he can present evidence of specific words or gestures
that reasonably encouraged or solicited in kind behavior.”); Ho, supra note 65, at 158 (“Only
if the defendant succeeded in showing that the plaintiff affirmatively welcomed the conduct
could he prevail over the sexual harassment claim.”); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only:
The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 525 (1994) (“The
suggested paradigm ... would limit the proof of welcomeness so that only objective evidence
of an invitation or consent given directly to the alleged harasser would suffice.”); Deborah N.
McFarland, Note, Beyond Sex Discrimination: A Proposal for Federal Sexual Harassment
Legislation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 541 (1996) (“General behavior of the victim, for example
his or her mode of dress, would not be evidence that he or she welcomed the harasser’s
conduct. Instead, the defendant will have to point to conduct that was directed at or involved
him or her.”).
154. See supra Part III.B.
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For the employer to succeed in its affirmative defense that the
plaintiff welcomed the accused’s conduct, the plaintiff must have
instigated the accused’s conduct through her words, and not through
her conduct. If the employer cannot point to verbal communication
from the plaintiff to the accused that demonstrates an unambiguous
invitation or solicitation of the accused’s conduct, the affirmative
defense will fail and the jury must find that the plaintiff did not
welcome the accused’s conduct.
Because of the threat of the power differential between supervi-
sors and subordinates, the burden of analyzing welcomeness should
be placed in the employer’s hands. This does not mean that if a
supervisor and a subordinate desire a romantic relationship that the
subordinate must be the one to initiate the relationship. Rather, it
means that any conduct that rises to the level of being reasonably
perceived as creating a hostile or abusive work environment must
be solicited or invited by the subordinate. A supervisor can certainly
initiate a romantic relationship with a subordinate without
engaging in severe or pervasive behavior that a reasonable person
would consider hostile or abusive.155 He cannot, however, reasonably
expect that his subordinate welcomes conduct that a reasonable
person would consider hostile or abusive absent any solicitation or
invitation on her part.
D. Framework’s Response to Five Common Criticisms of                  
    Unwelcomeness
This framework for the unwelcome requirement responds to all
five of the criticisms to the requirement, as outlined above,156 when
the accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor at the time of the alleged
harassment. First, this standard presumes that any severe or
pervasive conduct based on sex that creates a hostile or abusive
work environment, both subjectively and objectively, is unwelcome
until the employer proves otherwise. This involves shifting the
burden of the unwelcomeness analysis from the plaintiff to the
155. This is especially true if Judge Richard Posner is correct in stating that sexual
harassment claims are intended to protect women from behavior that can render their work
environment “hellish.” Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995).
156. See supra Part II.B.
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defendant-employer when the accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor
at the time of the alleged harassment. Instead of the plaintiff having
the burden of proving unwelcomeness, the employer has an
affirmative defense of proving welcomeness, which is a framework
many critics of the unwelcome requirement recommend.157
Second, this conception of the unwelcome requirement takes away
the fact-finder’s focus from the plaintiff ’s conduct and refocuses it
on whether the accused’s conduct was severe or pervasive and
created a hostile or abusive work environment. This framework
responds to the critics who claim that in a hostile environment suit,
the focus should not be on what the plaintiff did or did not do, but
rather on what the accused did or did not do to the plaintiff.158
Although the employer’s affirmative defense enables the employer
to admit evidence of the plaintiff ’s verbal communication to the
accused, such evidence is limited to unambiguous solicitations of the
accused’s conduct.
Third, this framework for unwelcomeness responds to the
criticism that the unwelcome requirement puts the plaintiff on
trial159 because the Supreme Court stated in Meritor that the
plaintiff ’s “personal fantasies” or “sexually provocative speech or
dress” are “obviously relevant” to the unwelcomeness inquiry.160
Under this Note’s framework, the plaintiff ’s “sexually provocative
speech” is relevant only in the context of the accused’s affirmative
defense, and only if that speech unambiguously invites, or solicits,
the accused’s conduct. The plaintiff ’s sexually provocative dress or
personal fantasies are inadmissible as a matter of law, unless
invoked by the plaintiff in a verbal communication between the
plaintiff and the accused. Consequently, this framework strays from
the Supreme Court’s holding in Meritor that “there is no per se rule
against [the] admissibility” of the plaintiff ’s “dress and personal
fantasies” in determining whether the accused’s conduct was
welcome.161
157. See supra Part II.B.1.
158. See supra Part II.B.2.
159. See supra Part II.B.3.
160. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986).
161. Id.
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Fourth, this Note’s framework responds to critics’ claims that the
unwelcome requirement is redundant.162 When viewed from the
perspective of the reasonable accused, the requirement is not
redundant of any other element of the hostile environment cause of
action, whether or not the accused was the plaintiff ’s supervisor.163
Because this Note’s conception of unwelcomeness applies the
reasonable accused perspective, the unwelcomeness analysis fulfills
its purpose of protecting consensual workplace relationships with-
out being redundant of any other element of the hostile environment
cause of action.
Finally, this Note’s framework addresses the problem of requiring
subordinates to inform their supervisors that their conduct is
unwelcome, actions that could put their working conditions and
even their job at risk.164 When the accused was the plaintiff ’s
supervisor at the time of the alleged harassment, the plaintiff does
not have the burden of proving unwelcomeness. In such a case, the
employer has the burden of establishing that the plaintiff unambig-
uously solicited or invited the accused’s conduct.
CONCLUSION
This Note advocates for a new framework for the unwelcome
requirement, a requirement that almost all of the federal courts of
appeals have imposed on plaintiffs in hostile work environment
cases under Title VII. When comparing the four different perspec-
tives one can use to analyze unwelcomeness, the reasonable accused
perspective best serves the goals of the unwelcome requirement and
Title VII. Applying research in supervisor-subordinate relations to
the reasonable accused perspective demonstrates the unreasonable-
ness of a supervisor believing that a subordinate welcomes severe
or pervasive conduct when a reasonable person would find that the
supervisor’s behavior created a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment. This Note advocates for an unwelcomeness framework in
supervisor-subordinate cases that shifts the burden to the employer
162. See supra Part II.B.4.
163. See supra Part III.A.4-5.
164. See supra Part II.B.5.
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to prove that the plaintiff welcomed the supervisor’s conduct and
limits the evidence available to prove such an affirmative defense.
This Note does not argue that the unwelcome requirement should
remain part of the plaintiff ’s prima facie case outside the
supervisor-subordinate context. Instead, this Note argues that in
such cases, the most productive use of the requirement is the
reasonable accused perspective. Accordingly, courts and commenta-
tors should balance the productivity of the unwelcome requirement
in protecting consensual workplace relationships against the poten-
tial harm caused by maintaining the requirement. Whatever the
result, the standard should reflect how people actually interact in
the workplace. Courts should impose requirements on individuals
only when it is realistic for them to abide by such standards, and
research regarding workplace interactions informs our discussion of
what standard is fair to impose on hostile work environment victims
in proving their claims.
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